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HUI V.CASTANEDA:
BEYOND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
Adele Kimmel, Arthur Bryant & Amy Radon*
When immigration detainee Francisco Castaneda died of penile cancer
in 2008 after what appeared to be intentional neglect by federal health
officials, his family members became plaintiffs in a lawsuit that
Castaneda had filed against the United States and several federal
Public Health Service (PHS) officers and employees. The suit alleged
medical negligence by the United States and constitutional violations by
the PHS officials. The PHS officials claimed immunity from suit, and
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that the family could not sue
the federal officials directly and that the only available remedy was
through a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. That decision has caused some to doubt the viability of so-called
Bivens actions, which allow plaintiffs to seek redress against federal
officials for constitutional violations. However, this Article, authored by
the Castaneda family's counsel-of-record and two of their co-counsel,
asserts that such doubt is unfounded because the Court anchored its
holding not to its Bivens jurisprudence but to its interpretation of
§ 233(a) of the Public Health Service Act, which immunizes PHS
officials from all civil actions. This Article argues that granting PHS
personnel special immunity from Bivens actions makes little sense and
that Congress should correct the incongruity exposed in Castaneda's
case-that PHS physicians enjoy greater protection in suits alleging
constitutional violations than do the other federal medical employees
with whom they work side by side.
* Adele Kimmel (University of Virginia, J.D., 1985; University of Virginia, M.A., 1986;
University of Virginia, B.A. with high honors, 1982) is Managing Attorney at the national
headquarters of Public Justice in Washington, D.C. She was counsel of record for the Castaneda
family in Hui v. Castaneda. Arthur Bryant (Harvard University, J.D., 1979; Swarthmore College,
A.B. with high honors, 1976), the Executive Director of Public Justice in Oakland, California,
and Amy Radon (University of Michigan, J.D., 2005; Arizona State University, B.A., 2001),
Public Justice's Goldberg, Waters & Krauss Fellow in Washington, D.C., were co-counsel in Hui
v. Castaneda. Co-counsel in the case also included Conal Doyle, of Willoughby Doyle, LLP in
Oakland, California, arguing counsel in the Supreme Court; Thomas M. Dempsey of the Law
Offices of Thomas M. Dempsey in Beverly Hills, California; and Leslie Brueckner, Senior
Attorney at Public Justice in Oakland, California.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Hui v. Castaneda,' the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that
the surviving family members and estate of an immigration detainee
could not sue federal Public Health Service (PHS) officials for
violating the detainee's constitutional rights.2 The issue in Castaneda
was whether the PHS officials who caused the penile amputation and
death of Francisco Castaneda could be sued for conduct that, in the
district court's words, was "beyond cruel and unusual."' The PHS
officials argued and the Supreme Court agreed that, even if PHS
officials blatantly violated Castaneda's constitutional rights, they
could not be held personally accountable.' The Court unanimously
held that Castaneda's family is limited to a negligence lawsuit
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)'
because 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) of the Public Health Service Act
immunizes PHS officials from all lawsuits, including those alleging
constitutional violations.6
The Supreme Court's decision in Castaneda has led some to
question whether the case sounds the death knell for Bivens actions'
by capping off a long line of cases in which the Court has refused to
allow victims of constitutional torts access to Bivens remedies.8 The
1. 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010).
2. Id. at 1848.
3. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
4. See Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1849.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2006).
6. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1848.
7. Lawsuits alleging constitutional violations by federal officials are known as "Bivens
actions." In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), the Court recognized an implied federal right of action for damages to enforce the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 389. In recognizing the plaintiffs right to sue, the Court effectively held that
federal law permits individuals to sue federal officials for constitutional violations. Id. at 395-96.
8. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (holding that landowner did not
have a Bivens claim against the U.S. government for an alleged trespass over an unrecorded
easement on his land); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423 (1988) (holding that the
improper denial of social security benefits due to an alleged due process violation in
administering a continuing disability review program did not give rise to a Bivens claim); United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1987) (holding that no Bivens remedy arose out of
activity occurring incident to or in the course of military service); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367,
388-90 (1983) (holding that a federal government employee did not have a judicial remedy for
alleged constitutional violations because an elaborate and comprehensive remedial system already
existed for employment-related claims). Subsequent to the Bivens decision, the Court has only
permitted a Bivens action in two other contexts: a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim
asserted by a discharged employee of a member of Congress, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
236-38 (1979); and an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment asserted by
BEYOND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
answer is: absolutely not. As the Court noted, the outcome of
Castaneda was determined by § 233(a)'s immunity-conferring
language,' not by the availability (or unavailability) of a Bivens
remedy under the Court's existing Bivens jurisprudence. " Noting the
"confines of [the Court's] judicial role," the Court took special note
of concerns that providing PHS personnel with absolute immunity
would create an anomalous result. PHS personnel, who work
alongside Bureau of Prisons (BOP) personnel in correctional
facilities, would be entitled to special immunity from Bivens actions
but BOP personnel-and other federal employees who perform the
same functions as PHS officials in the same facilities-would not. "
The Court nonetheless held that it was required to "read the statute
according to its text," which the Court found immunized the PHS
defendants from Bivens actions. 12
This Article discusses the facts and procedural history of
Castaneda, the federal statutes at issue, the Supreme Court's ruling
and its implications, and the reasons that special Bivens immunity for
PHS personnel makes no sense. We explain that the ruling in
Castaneda was a function of the particular statute at issue and thus is
unrelated to the Court's trend of limiting the availability of Bivens
remedies. The ruling does, however, serve as an invitation to
Congress to correct the incongruity of providing PHS medical
personnel with greater immunity than that enjoyed by other federal
medical personnel with whom the PHS personnel work side by side.
No federally employed physicians should be able to violate the
Constitution with impunity.
II. Hui v. CASTANEDA'S FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Francisco Castaneda was an immigration detainee who, during
his almost eleven months in the custody of U.S. Immigration and
the surviving family member of a federal prisoner, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1980).
It has been three decades since the Court has recognized the availability of a Bivens remedy in
any other context.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (2006).
10. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1851-52, 1855.
11. Id. at 1854-55. In Carlson, the Supreme Court held that an Eighth Amendment claim for
deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs was actionable against BOP
personnel under Bivens. 446 U.S. at 18-20.
12. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1855.
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Customs Enforcement (ICE), received such shockingly bad medical
care that the district court said that the case "should be taught to
every law student as conduct for which the moniker 'cruel' is
inadequate."" Because the PHS officials responsible for Castaneda's
medical care refused to perform a simple skin biopsy that they knew
was necessary to save his life, Castaneda had his penis amputated
and ultimately died of penile cancer at the age of thirty-six. 14
ICE detained Castaneda at the San Diego Correctional Facility
(SDCF) beginning on March 27, 2006.5 When he arrived at SDCF,
he had an irregular, raised lesion on his penis that was growing,
becoming more painful, bleeding, and exuding discharge. 16 He
promptly brought his condition to the attention of the PHS medical
personnel who had been assigned through ICE's Division of
Immigration Health Services (DIHS) to provide medical care to
detainees at SDCF. 17 Noting Castaneda's large "mushroomed"
genital lesion and family history of cancer, the physician's assistant
who examined him the day after he arrived at SDCF recommended
that Castaneda undergo a urology consultation and biopsy "ASAP." 1
Despite the physician's assistant's urgent request, DIHS did not
approve the request until two months later. 1 Moreover, even though
DIHS eventually approved the request, Castaneda never got a biopsy
during his remaining eight months in ICE custody. 20 This was not for
lack of effort on Castaneda's part. Between March 2006 and January
2007, he persistently sought treatment for his condition, which
continued to deteriorate. 21 The Court noted: "As his disease
progressed, the lesion became increasingly painful and interfered
with his urination, defecation, and sleep." 2 2 In less than eight months,
the lesion had grown to the point where Castaneda's boxer shorts
13. Castanedav. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298 n.16 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
14. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 686-87 (9th Cir. 2008); Castaneda, 538 F.
Supp. 2d at 1285.
15. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Hui v.
Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (Nos. 08-1529 and 08-1547), 2009 WL 2009352.
16. Id
17. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1849.
18. Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 684-85.
19. Castaneda, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1281.
20. Id. at 1285.
21. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1849.
22. Id.
300
BEYOND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
were continuously stained with blood and discharge, and he could no
longer urinate while standing because the urine "spray[ed]
everywhere." 2 3 In December 2006, Castaneda reported a lump in his
groin.24
During Castaneda's detention, a "PHS physician's assistant and
three outside specialists repeatedly advised that Castaneda needed a
biopsy to ascertain whether he had cancer."" However, the PHS
defendants-Esther Hui (the physician responsible for Castaneda's
medical care during his detention at SDCF) and Stephen Gonsalves
(SDCF's Health Services Administrator)-denied requests for a
biopsy and other recommended procedures by categorizing the
procedures as "elective." 26 Instead, Castaneda was "treated" with
ibuprofen and antihistamines and given an additional allotment of
boxer shorts.27
In January 2007, after two more outside specialists
recommended a biopsy-one describing Castaneda's penis as a
"mess" 2 8 and both concluding that he "most likely [had] penile
cancer" 29-the procedure was finally scheduled. 30 Instead of
providing treatment, however, ICE abruptly released Castaneda on
February 5, 2007, a few days before the biopsy was to occur.3'
Within days of his release, Castaneda went to the emergency room of
Harbor-UCLA Hospital in Los Angeles, where he was diagnosed
with squamous cell carcinoma of the penis. 3 2 His penis was
amputated on February 14, and he began chemotherapy after tests
confirmed that the cancer had spread to his groin." The treatment
was unsuccessful, and Castaneda died a year later, on February 16,
2008.34
23. Castaneda, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
24. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1849.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Castaneda, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1298 n.16.
28. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 2008).
29. Id.
30. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1849.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1285 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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Three months before his death, Castaneda had filed a lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The
lawsuit included medical negligence claims against the United States
under the FTCA as well as Bivens claims against federal PHS
officials for deliberate indifference to Castaneda's serious medical
needs in violation of his Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights. 3 After
his death, the court substituted Castaneda's sister and personal
representative, Yanira Castaneda, along with his minor daughter and
sole heir, Vanessa Castaneda, as plaintiffs. 36
The PHS defendants moved to dismiss the Bivens claims against
them, arguing that § 233(a) "gives them absolute immunity from
Bivens actions by making a suit against the United States under the
FTCA the exclusive remedy" for injuries caused by PHS personnel
in the course of their medical or related functions.3 7 The district court
denied the motion, concluding that § 233(a)'s text and legislative
history show that Congress intended to preserve Bivens actions. "
Specifically, the district court held that § 233(a), through its
reference to FTCA provisions, "incorporates the provision of the
FTCA which explicitly preserves a plaintiffs right to bring a Bivens
action."39
The district court also observed that the evidence the plaintiffs
had "already produced at this early stage in the litigation is more
thorough and compelling than the complete evidence compiled in
some meritorious Eighth Amendment actions."4 0 The court further
rejected the "[d]efendants' attempt to sidestep responsibility for what
appears to be, if the evidence holds up, one of the most, if not the
most, egregious Eighth Amendment violations the Court has ever
encountered." 4 1 The court concluded its opinion by noting that the
"[d]efendants' own records bespeak of conduct that transcends
negligence by miles."42
35. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1849.
36. Id. Castaneda's daughter acted through her mother, Lucia Pelayo. Id.
37. Id. at 1849-50.
38. Castaneda, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 1288-95.
39. Id. at 1289.
40. Id. at 1295.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1298 n.16.
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The PHS defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the district
court's immunity ruling.4 3 Soon thereafter, the United States filed a
Notice of Admission of Liability for Medical Negligence, admitting
liability and causation regarding the plaintiffs' medical negligence
claim."
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's judgment that § 233(a) does not preclude the
Castaneda family's Bivens claims. 4 The court turned to the Supreme
Court's decision in Carlson v. Green46 as "the starting point" for its
analysis." It examined § 233(a) under Carlson's two-factor test for
Bivens preemption, which requires the party asserting preemption to
demonstrate either (1) that there are "special factors counselling
hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress," or (2)
"that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly
declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the
Constitution and viewed as equally effective." 48
Looking to the statute's text and history, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that § 233(a) cannot be read as a declaration of Congress's
intent to substitute the FTCA for Bivens relief because (1) Bivens
relief did not exist when Congress enacted § 233(a) and (2) the
statute does not mention the Constitution." The court found further
support for this conclusion in the statute's legislative history and a
later amendment to the FTCA.so
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the FTCA remedy and a
Bivens remedy are not equally effective for the reasons articulated in
Carlson. " The court reasoned that a Bivens remedy, unlike the FTCA
remedy, is a more effective deterrent because it is awarded against
individual defendants and may include punitive damages.52 In
addition, liability in Bivens cases is governed by uniform federal
43. Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1850 (2010).
44. Id. at 1850 n.3.
45. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 701-02 (9th Cir. 2008).
46. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
47. Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 688.
48. Id (quoting Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19).
49. Id at 692.
50. Id at 692-98.
51. Id. at 689-91.
52. Id. at 689-90.
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rules, rather than by the law of the state in which the violation
occurred, and plaintiffs may try Bivens cases before a jury.13 After
further concluding that no special factors militated against finding a
Bivens remedy available in these circumstances, the court held that
the Castaneda family's Bivens action could proceed.54
On May 3, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed that decision,
holding that § 233(a) provides PHS officers and employees
immunity from Bivens actions for harms arising out of their medical
or related duties. 5
III. STATUTES INVOLVED IN Hui v. CASTANEDA56
[Castaneda] involve[d] two federal statutes addressing
the scope of immunity afforded to PHS personnel: 42
U.S.C. § 233 [of the PHS Act] and 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) [of
the FTCA].
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 233 as part of the
Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
623, 84 Stat. 1868. The immunity provision in § 233(a) was
a response to the Surgeon General's request that PHS
personnel receive protection from ordinary malpractice
liability. See 91 Cong. Rec. H42543 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
1970) (statement of Rep. Staggers, House sponsor of bill)
(noting that the Surgeon General requested the amendment
because PHS doctors "cannot afford to take out the
customary liability insurance as most doctors do").
Congress addressed this issue by making an action
against the United States under the FTCA-a statute
designed to protect federal employees from common-law
tort liability-the "exclusive" remedy for people injured by
PHS officials' malpractice. Section 233(a) provides:
DEFENSE OF CERTAIN MALPRACTICE AND
NEGLIGENCE SUITS
The remedy against the United States provided by sections
1346(b) and 2672 of title 28 ... for damage for personal injury,
53. Id. at 690.
54. Id. at 700-02.
55. Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1848 (2010).
56. This part is excerpted from the respondents' Supreme Court brief.
304
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including death, resulting from the performance of medical ...
or related functions ... by any commissioned officer or
employee of the Public Health Service while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, shall be exclusive of any
other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject-
matter against the officer or employee ... whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim.
42 U.S.C. § 233(a).
It was not until the following year that [the Supreme]
Court decided Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971),
a case charging federal agents with constitutional violations
under the Fourth Amendment and permitting, for the first
time, a constitutional damages claim against them. Prior to
Bivens, no reported decision allowed constitutional
damages claims against federal officials.
Five years later, in 1976, [the Supreme] Court decided
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976), which
recognized an Eighth Amendment claim against state
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on their deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs. Prior to
Estelle, the Court had not recognized an Eighth
Amendment claim for a prisoner's inadequate medical care.
In 1980-ten years after Congress enacted § 233(a)-
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980), held that
such claims are actionable against federal officials under
Bivens. In Carlson, the federal defendants were medical
personnel employed by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
and the PHS. [The Supreme] Court found the FTCA
inadequate to remedy the Eighth Amendment violation at
issue that had resulted in the death of a federal prisoner, and
found it "crystal clear" that "Congress views FTCA and
Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action." 446
U.S. at 20.
Eight years later, in 1988, Congress amended the
FTCA in response to [the Supreme] Court's decision in
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 299 (1988), which held
that federal employees were not entitled to absolute
305Fall 2010]
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immunity from common-law torts committed in the scope
of their employment. See Federal Employees Liability
Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the "Westfall
Act"), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4653 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671-80). As amended the FTCA provides:
(1) The remedy against the United States provided by sections
1346(b) and 2672 of this title for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death arising or resulting from the negligent
or wrongful act ... of any employee of the Government . .. is
exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money
damages by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee ... Any other civil action ... arising out of or
relating to the same subject matter against the employee . .. is
precluded ....
(2) Paragraph (1) does not extend or apply to a civil action
against an employee of the Government-
(A) which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the
United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added). As the
italicized language shows, although the FTCA provides all
federal employees with immunity from common-law torts,
it simultaneously preserves personal liability for
constitutional violations-i.e., Bivens actions.
Section 233 depends on the FTCA for much of its
effect. Section 233(a) explicitly refers to the "remedy
against the United States provided by sections 1346(b) and
2672 of title 28"-i.e., the FTCA remedy-and provides
that, where PHS officials cause certain types of damage, the
FTCA remedy against the United States is exclusive. 42
U.S.C. § 233(a). The "exclusive remedy" of § 233(a) is
explicitly subject to § 1346(b), which, in turn, is "[s]ubject
to the provisions of chapter 171" of Title 28. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b). Chapter 171 codifies the Westfall Act, and the
Westfall Act, in turn, expressly preserves Bivens remedies
in § 2679(b) ("The [exclusive] remedy against the United
States provided by [the FTCA] . . . does not extend or apply
to a civil action against an employee of the Government ...
which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the
BEYOND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
United States.") (emphasis added).
Petitioners' position is that § 233(a) affords them
immunity from Bivens actions, notwithstanding that all
other federal employees-including their BOP
counterparts-are subject to Bivens liability. "
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION IN
CASTANEDA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The ruling in Castaneda is not part of the Court's general trend
of limiting the availability of a Bivens remedy. The Court made a
point of distinguishing the issue of whether a federal official is
amenable to suit from the issue of whether a damages remedy is
available for a particular constitutional violation under Bivens. s The
Court viewed the case as involving the question of whether § 233(a)
provides PHS officials with immunity from suit and "express[ed] no
opinion as to whether a Bivens remedy is otherwise available in these
circumstances."59 The unanimity of the opinion, atypical of the
Court's other Bivens rulings,60 further evidences that the ruling in
Castaneda was a function of the particular statute at issue, rather
than a function of the Court's views on the availability of a Bivens
remedy. Thus, it would be a mistake to interpret Castaneda as
limiting the availability of Bivens actions.
The Court viewed the question of whether PHS officials are
subject to Bivens actions purely as an issue of statutory construction:
"Our inquiry in this case begins and ends with the text of § 233(a).""
The Court held that "[§] 233(a) grants absolute immunity to PHS
57. Brief for Respondents at 9-14, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (No. 08-1529),
2010 WL 197357 (footnotes omitted).
58. Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1851-52 (2010).
59. Id. at 1852 n.6.
60. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (holding that a landowner did not have
a Bivens claim against the U.S. government for an alleged trespass over an unrecorded easement
on his land); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that under Bivens, no
implied private right of action existed for damages against private entities acting under color of
federal law); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (holding that an alleged due process
violation resulting in the improper denial of social security benefits in the administration of a
disability review program did not create a Bivens claim); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669
(1987) (finding no Bivens remedy arising out of activity incident to, or in the course of, military
service).
61. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1850 (citing Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 254 (2000)).
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[personnel] for actions arising out of the performance of medical or
related functions within the scope of their employment by barring all
actions against them for such conduct," including Bivens actions. 62 In
the Court's view, § 233(a) limits the recovery for such conduct to
suits against the United States under the FTCA.63 The Court found
support for its reading in the broad language of the statute, which
makes the remedy against the United States provided by the FTCA
"exclusive of any other civil action" arising out of "the same subject-
matter."' The fact that the statute preceded the Court's decision in
Bivens did not affect the Court's conclusion because the Court read
the statute's language as broad enough to cover both known and
unknown causes of action. 6
The Court also found support for its reading of § 233(a) in the
Westfall Act.66 The Court viewed the Westfall Act's explicit
exception for Bivens claims as "powerful evidence" that Congress
did not intend § 233(a)'s exclusivity provision to imply such an
exception. 6
The Castaneda family offered four main arguments in support of
its position that § 233(a) does not preclude Bivens actions against
PHS personnel. The Court directly addressed and rejected three of
the family's arguments."
First, the family argued that the plain language of § 233(a)
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to provide PHS officials
with immunity from Bivens actions.69 Because the immunity
conferred by § 233(a) is subject to the italicized language from the
Westfall Act-language that indisputably exempts Bivens actions
62. Id. at 1851 (emphasis added).
63. Id.
64. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (2006)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1851.
68. Id. at 1852-54.
69. Id. at 1852. As discussed in Part II, supra, that provision is expressly subject to
§ 1346(b) of the FTCA, which, in turn, is "[s]ubject to the provisions of chapter 171" of Title 28.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). Chapter 171 codifies the Westfall Act, id. §§ 2671-2680, which
expressly preserves Bivens actions: "The remedy against the United States provided by [the
FTCA] ... does not extend or apply to a civil action against an employee of the Government ...
which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States." Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall) Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, sec. 5,
§ 2679(b)(1)-(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680).
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from the scope of immunity for all federal employees-the
Castaneda family argued that the PHS defendants' immunity defense
was unavailing." In short, the Castaneda family argued that § 233(a)
incorporates by reference the Westfall Act's exception for Bivens
actions." The Supreme Court rejected this argument primarily
because it read § 233(a) as incorporating only those provisions of
chapter 171 of the FTCA that establish "[t]he remedy against the
United States" 72 and did not view the Westfall Act's exception for
Bivens actions to be such a provision.
Second, the Castaneda family argued that other provisions of
§ 233 show that subsection (a) does not preclude Bivens actions
against PHS personnel. 74 For example, § 233(c), known as the
"scope certification" provision, speaks volumes by what it does not
include: a mechanism that triggers a federal employee's bid for
immunity in a federal court action. 7 A federal employee may not
claim personal immunity under an "exclusive remedy" provision
until the government or a district court certifies that the employee
acted within the scope of employment when he or she committed the
tort from which the suit arose. Section 233(c), however, does not
contain a scope-certification procedure where a PHS officer or
employee faces a federal court action.n The Castaneda family
showed that § 233(c) lacked an applicable scope-certification
provision, which led the PHS defendants to use a certification
provision in the FTCA that itself was subject to the FTCA's Bivens
exception." Because of this, the family argued that § 233(a) was not
intended to immunize PHS personnel from Bivens claims.79
70. See Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1852.
71. Id. This was the district court's primary basis for rejecting the PHS defendants' bid for
immunity. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289-90 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
73. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1852-53.
74. Id. at 1853.
75. Id
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006).
77. In a federal action, a PHS officer or employee would seek scope certification under an
FTCA provision that is subject to the FTCA's express preservation of Bivens actions against all
federal employees. 42 U.S.C. § 233(c).
78. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1853-54.
79. Id.
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In addition, the family argued that § 233(f)'s "insure or
indemnify" provision, o which authorizes the government to
indemnify or provide liability insurance for PHS personnel under
certain circumstances, confirmed that § 233(a)'s exclusivity language
permits Bivens actions." They asserted that the inclusion of such a
provision in § 233 showed that Congress never intended to immunize
PHS officials from all liability because absent liability, there would
be no need for indemnification or insurance. 82
Again, the Court found these arguments unpersuasive. The
Court found that scope certification by the Attorney General is not a
prerequisite to immunity under § 233(a) because a PHS defendant
could prove that the alleged misconduct occurred in the course of
official duties pursuant to the ordinary rules of evidence and
procedure. " In the Court's view, the Castaneda family's argument
based on § 233(f)'s insure-or-indemnify provision was also
unavailing because, even if that provision allows an injured party to
proceed directly against a PHS official when that party has no FTCA
remedy against the United States, that was not the case here; the
Castaneda family had an FTCA remedy for the misconduct alleged. 84
Third, the Castaneda family argued that the Westfall Act's
Bivens exception in § 2679(b)(2)(A) directly preserves a Bivens
action against PHS officers and employees because that provision
applies on its face to all federal employees. " The Court viewed this
reading as effecting an "implied repeal" of the "more specific
provision" in § 233(a), for which it found no support in the Westfall
Act's text or history. 86
Fourth, the Castaneda family argued that § 233(a) could not be
read to preclude Bivens actions against PHS personnel because the
provision does not satisfy Carlson's "explicit declaration" test for
Bivens immunity. " In Carlson, the Court held that a federal
80. 42 U.S.C. § 233(f).
81. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. at 1854.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1853.
86. Id.
87. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 691-92 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)).
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defendant may defeat a Bivens action by "show[ing] that Congress
has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be
a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed
as equally effective."" In the Castaneda family's view, § 233(a)
could not possibly satisfy the explicit-declaration test for abrogating
a Bivens cause of action against PHS personnel because the statutory
language lacked clear proof that Congress actually contemplated that
§ 233(a) would abrogate a Bivens claim." Indeed, when Congress
enacted § 233(a) in 1970, it did not consider-and could not have
considered-whether that provision should supplant a Bivens remedy
because Bivens had not yet been decided; further, the Court did not
recognize constitutional claims like those at issue in this case until
ten years later when it decided Carlson. Put another way, § 233(a)
cannot be read to preclude Bivens actions against PHS personnel
because-as in other areas implicating the separation of powers-
legislative action cannot abrogate a recognized constitutional remedy
unless Congress has "clearly stated" its intent to do so.9"
The Court did not directly address these arguments in its
opinion. 91 Instead, the Court treated this case simply as an exercise in
statutory construction. In doing so, it failed to recognize that the case
was ultimately about the requirements of the Constitution. Under the
explicit-declaration test for precluding a Bivens claim, which is a
type of "clear statement rule,"92 a court should not hold that a
recognized constitutional remedy has been abrogated unless
Congress has clearly stated its intent to do so in favor of another
remedy that Congress views as equally effective." Such clear-
statement rules ensure that courts do not interpret statutes in a
manner that strains the boundaries of Congress's constitutional
88. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
89. Brief for National Experts on Health Services for Detained Persons as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 6-15, Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010) (No. 08-1529)
[hereinafter Brief for National Experts on Health Services].
90. Id
91. The Court also did not address the Castaneda family's arguments about other indicia of
Congressional intent, including § 233(a)'s title and the legislative history of the Westfall Act.
92. The Court has invoked clear statement rules in a variety of contexts, including federal
criminal jurisdiction, constitutional requirements for state office-holders, regulation of foreign-
flagged vessels, and the courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction. Brief for National Experts on Health
Services, supra note 89, at 8 n.2 (citing cases).
93. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971).
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power or that abrogates significant rights unless Congress clearly
states an intention to do so. 94 They also ensure "that the courts do not
wrongly interpret statutes in ways that impose restrictions on
fundamental rights or threaten constitutional checks and balances."9 5
By treating this case as merely about statutory construction, the
Court failed in its role as the ultimate arbiter of what the Constitution
requires.
V. WHY THERE SHOULD BE A BIVENS REMEDY
AGAINST PHS MEDICAL PERSONNEL
The constitutional violation at issue in Castaneda involved the
deprivation of human life, not deprivation of a property or
employment interest; this made the case unlike any other the Court
had considered since Carlson. Recognizing the gravity of this
deprivation, the district court found that the defendants' actions were
"beyond cruel and unusual."9 6 Given the abject cruelty of the PHS
defendants' conduct, there is no adequate alternative to Bivens that
could remedy a constitutional violation of this nature.
As in Carlson, the alternative remedy for the Castaneda family
is damages against the United States under the FTCA.9 7 Because the
United States has admitted that its employees' medical negligence
caused Castaneda's death, the family certainly will have a remedy
under the FTCA. 98 An FTCA remedy, however, is hardly an
adequate substitute. This is primarily because the Castaneda family
may not bring its constitutional claims for inadequate medical care
against the United States under the FTCA because the United States
94. Brief for National Experts on Health Services, supra note 89, at 8.
95. Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
96. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
97. The alternative remedies available to the plaintiffs in other Bivens cases considered by
the Court, such as restoration of benefits, back pay, seniority, or reinstatement, see, e.g., Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) (holding that a federal government employee did not have a judicial
remedy for alleged constitutional violations because an elaborate and comprehensive remedial
system existed for claims arising out of an employment relationship), would do nothing to
compensate the Castaneda estate for the horrific suffering that Castaneda endured or to
compensate Vanessa Castaneda for the loss of her father. It is damages or nothing for the
Castaneda family.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
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has not waived sovereign immunity from suits for constitutional
violations."
The Supreme Court held in Carlson that a Bivens remedy is
more effective than an FTCA remedy. 100 The Court enumerated four
factors supporting this conclusion, 10' but two factors in particular
demonstrate why a Bivens remedy is far superior for redressing
constitutional violations of the kind suffered by Castaneda: (1) the
deterrent effect of a Bivens remedy and (2) the uniform rules
governing Bivens relief. 1'
The Court explained in Carlson that because the Bivens remedy
is recoverable against individuals, it is a more effective deterrent
against the United States than the FTCA remedy: "It is almost
axiomatic that the threat of damages has a deterrent effect, surely
particularly so when the individual official faces personal financial
liability." 103 Since Carlson, the Court has continued to confirm the
importance of individual deterrence. " Deterrence remains essential
today because federal medical personnel have the unique ability to
impose a death sentence-without a judge or jury-by purposefully
failing to treat a life-threatening disease in a prisoner with no other
health care access, as the PHS defendants did in Castaneda's case.
Protecting physicians from ordinary malpractice claims is a
reasonable and practical endeavor; on the other hand, "[p]rotecting
individuals who intentionally inflict cruel and unusual punishment
just because they happen to work for the Public Health Service is
not." 1' The Castaneda case presents the quintessential example of
conduct that the Bivens remedy was intended to deter. '06
99. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1994) (holding that the
plaintiffs constitutional tort claim is not "cognizable" under § 1346(b) because that section does
not provide a cause of action for such a claim).
100. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
101. Id at 20-23.
102. Moreover, as explained below, the FTCA remedy is less effective now than it was when
Carlson was decided thirty years ago, making a Bivens remedy all the more important.
103. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21 (citation omitted).
104. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 485 (refusing to extend Bivens claims to federal agencies because
"the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be lost"); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001) (refusing to extend Bivens to private entities because doing so
would not "advance Bivens' core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in
unconstitutional wrongdoing").
105. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1294 n.13 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
106. In the district court's view, the evidence that the Castaneda family had presented through
the government's own medical records made "a strong case for punitive damages because it
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Similarly, the Castaneda case confirms the continued
importance of a uniform federal remedy for constitutional violations
resulting in death. Under the FTCA, state law constrains the
Castaneda family's potential remedies, as the United States may only
be held liable "in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred." ' As the Ninth Circuit noted in Castaneda,
since Carlson was decided, there has been a sea change in state tort
law, particularly in the area of medical malpractice. ' Twenty-three
states have placed caps on noneconomic damages, making the
variations in law from state to state even greater now than when the
Supreme Court decided Carlson in 1980. 109 California law prohibits
survivors from recovering pre-death pain and suffering damages and
caps noneconomic damages at $250,000 for wrongful death. "0 In
contrast, Bivens actions do not cap damages and the federal survival
rule allows for pre-death pain and suffering.'
The facts of Castaneda vividly illustrate why $250,000 is a
woefully inadequate remedy for the "Kafkaesque nightmare" 112 that
Castaneda suffered. As the Supreme Court noted in Estelle, "In the
worst cases, [a failure to provide medical care] may actually produce
physical 'torture or a lingering death." " "Physical torture" and
"lingering death" are exactly what Castaneda endured. He suffered in
agony for eleven months while blood and pus oozed from lesions on
his penis. He needed medication to sleep because of his anxiety over
his condition and lack of treatment. According to the district court,
the care afforded Castaneda "can be characterized by one word:
nothing." 114 After ICE released Castaneda from custody, his penis
shows that Defendants' behavior was both callous and misleading." Id. at 1297. Because punitive
damages are not available under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2006), a Bivens remedy would be
particularly appropriate.
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006).
108. Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 691.
110. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West
2010).
Ill. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24-25 (1980) (noting that the liability of federal agents
for constitutional claims should not depend on where the violation occurred); Bass v.
Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the federal survival rule applies to
civil rights claims and permits pre-death pain and suffering).
112. Castaneda, 546 F.3d at 694 n.12.
113. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
114. Castaneda v. United States, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1295 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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was amputated, and he died slowly over the next year. It is likely that
few, if any, prisoners in our nation's history have endured a more
torturous and lingering death at the hands of a government medical
provider.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even more than Carlson does, Castaneda shows why an FTCA
remedy is an inadequate substitute for a Bivens remedy. As a result
of the Court's ruling in Castaneda, however, the Castaneda family
will only be compensated for the medical negligence that the PHS
personnel committed, not for the additional quantum of harm
resulting from the PHS personnel's constitutional violations. The
Court's decision effectively equates simple negligence with "conduct
for which the moniker 'cruel' is inadequate." "' The PHS
personnel-whose conduct was "beyond cruel and unusual" 1 16 -will
continue with their jobs and lives as if they did no harm. There is
something terribly wrong with this lack of personal accountability.
But now, only Congress can fix this. If Congress fails to amend
§ 233(a) to right this wrong, and PHS personnel can continue to
commit egregious constitutional violations with impunity, then our
system for providing detainees with medical care will itself be
"beyond cruel and unusual."
115. Id. at 1298 n.16.
116. Id. at 1298.
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